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Juries and the Concept of Sustainability   
For centuries many countries have persisted with the peer jury criminal trials; inherited or 
adopted from common law.  Many regard this feature of the criminal justice system as 
sacrosanct; the purpose of the paper is to consider its sustainability.   
 
Increased criminal governance and population growth, accompanied by a pro rata increase 
in crime and perceived increase per se, has resulted in increased pressure on the criminal 
judicial system.  Pressure has also been added by the ever increasing complexities of 
modern society and its effects on the modern criminal trial; they exist in tandem and are in 
a constant state of evolution; as society changes and advances, laws and infrastructure are 
created, modified and refined to ensure governance.  Is the current jury system sustainable? 
Sustainability is a relatively new concept,1 although originally created in a natural environment 
context, it is a concept that has broadened and applies across all societal institutions; public and 
private.  Arguably, it should be considered across all aspects of our society.  Sustainability is a self 
maintaining balance of and between society, and all it entails, and the natural environment, so that 
the longevity of both is assured.  The United Nations believes it is in the ‘common interest of all 
countries to pursue policies aimed at sustainable and environmentally sound development’ .2 
 
The Brundtland Report agreed that the future development of society should be aligned to 
sustainability taking into account social and environmental considerations,3 and has become 
the basis for significant research, discourse and action in sustainability issues including 
corporate and institutional sustainability.  Whilst we can get bogged down in definitions and 
appropriate sustainability indicators, theoretical and practical frameworks and key concepts 
have been developed, and are increasingly utilised in organisation policy and practice.  A 
concept used in the private sector is that of the triple bottom line ‘people, planet, profit’, 
which might be modified for the public sector to be:  ‘planet, people, governance, services 
and administration’.4 
Government institutions must foster sustainability.  They must be balanced from a cost 
benefit perspective as institutions in themselves, so that they are socially and financially 
sustainable, and as against environmental responsibilities.  Sustainable institutions benefit 
the environment, directly for example through the minimisation of waste of resources, and 
indirectly for example through savings that can then be redirected back into environment  
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through education and rectification, or to other areas of our society in need of funding.    
Government institution streamlining5 means greater sustainability for the institution itself 
and for the environment.  Such streamlining will necessarily involve thinking about how they 
are meeting societal needs, balanced with the environment.  It will also involve the 
reconsideration of its values spectrum, for example individual rights as against societal and 
environmental responsibilities. 
How is sustainability related to legal systems, specifically peer criminal juries?  It is argued 
legal systems, and juries as an apparatus of legal systems, need to be reconsidered, 
reformed and or developed in a sustainability context.  The central issues are viability and 
efficacy; it is argued that in order that a system of civil and criminal justice be sustainable, 
due regard must be paid to the requirements of economy and effectiveness,6  issues which 
have dogged peer criminal jury systems for some time.  Whilst justice is a non-negotiable 
concept integral to our legal system and business models are not necessarily applicable, 
justice as a concept can be redefined and the processes leading to the attainment of justice 
can and must be reconsidered, and altered if necessary, in the context of sustainability.  This 
implies reconsideration of what justice means in a modern context, challenging the 
perpetuation of existing systems on historical theory and principle, and at all costs.7 
The authors of this article are not alone in questioning the viability or efficacy of current 
peer criminal jury systems.  Judge French considers ‘the role of trial by jury as it presently 
operates can be a significant impediment to a timely, efficient and effective criminal justice 
system’.8  Murray Gleeson AC, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, has stated  
In the administration of civil and criminal justice, Australian courts, like most courts throughout the world, 
suffer from the twin problems of cost and delay.
9
 
The article questions whether, according to traditional theory and principle, current peer 
criminal juries are functional, 10 and whether modifications would make the system more 
sustainable.  One can also question whether in the light of statistics on the number of 
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 The problems canvassed in this article are identified in authoritative literature.  However empirical research 
is almost nonexistent due to jury confidentiality issues, with much of the research being based on simulated, 
or shadow, jury research which is often criticised as unreliable due to lack of authenticity.  As such 
commentary tends to be anecdotal or based on observation.  Refer to Queensland Law Reform Commission, A 
review of jury directions, Issues Paper WP No 66 (2009)[2.14] and [7.10]-[7.15].   
criminal trials that do go before a peer jury determination, the weight placed on the concept 
of jury trials is being given disproportionate weight to the costs of retaining the system. 
The purpose of the article is to encourage thinking beyond traditional arguments, with a 
view to refocusing direction on sustainability.   As we will see, there are a number of 
strengths and advantages of a peer jury system;11 on the other hand, there are many 
deficiencies in the way the jury system currently operates.  It suggests an alternative; better 
‘quality’ criminal juries.  The precise meaning of this concept will be explained later.  Such a 
jury has the potential to alleviate and or overcome existing peer criminal jury problems, and 
in doing so increase criminal jury sustainability.  It will be argued that such juries do not 
necessarily abrogate the constitutional protection afforded an accused to the right to a trial 
by a jury or fair trial,12 but do impinge on some traditional theories about that right.  
Arguments in Favour of Juries 
Many eminent jurists have referred to the fundamental nature of jury trials to the criminal justice 
system.  Lord Atkin described the right as ‘ingrained … in the British constitution and in the British 
idea of justice’.13  Lord John Russell held it was to trial by jury that the British Government owed the 
attachment of its people to the laws.14  Blackstone called it the ‘grand bulwark of English liberties, 
which cannot but subsist so long as this palladium remains sacred and inviolate’.15  Deane J referred 
to the jury system as a  
 
Deep seated conviction of free men and women about the way in which justice should be administered in 
criminal cases.  That conviction finds a solid basis in an understanding of the history and functioning of the 
common law as a bulwark against the tyranny of arbitrary punishment.
16
 
The United States Supreme Court noted that country’s protection of the right in these 
terms: 
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from our history and experience that it was necessary to protect 
against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the 
                                                          
11
 One of the authors of this article has advocated that the right to trial by jury must be protected and 
enhanced, and does not resile from these views here:  Anthony Gray ‘Mockery and the Right to Trial by Jury’ 
(2006) 6(1) QUT Law and Justice Journal 66-88; ‘A Right to Trial by Jury at State Level?’ (2009) 15(1) Australian 
Journal of Human Rights 99 
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 Constitution s 80, and note s604 (1) CC (Qld). 
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 Lords Debates, 5
th
 series, Vol 87, 1054; in Ford v Blurton 38 TLR 80 (finding trial by jury to be ‘an essential 
element of our law.  It has been the bulwark of liberty, the shield of the poor from the oppression of the rich 
and powerful.  Anyone who knows the history of our law knows that many of the liberties of the subject were 
originally established and are maintained by the verdicts of juries’; Lord Devlin in Trial by Jury (1966) declared 
trial by jury as the ‘lamp that shows that freedom lives … the first object of any tyrant … would be to make 
Parliament subservient to his will, and the next to overthrow or diminish trial by jury, for no tyrant could afford 
to leave a subject’s freedom in the hands of twelve of his countrymen (164). 
14
 English Government, 394; see also Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1
st
 ed, 1966 rep) 
Book III, 379-381, Book IV 342-344.  William Forsyth in History of Trial by Jury (1875) claims the ‘whole 
establishment of Kings, Lords and Commons and all the laws and statutes of the realm have only one great 
object, and that is to bring twelve men into a jury box’ (449). 
15
 Commentaries on the Laws of England (1876 ed, vol 4), p342-343. 
16
 Kingswell v R (1985) 159 CLR 264; see also Brennan J who referred to the jury system as ‘the chief guardian 
of liberty under the law and the community’s guarantee of sound administration of criminal justice’ (Brown v 
The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 171, 197; Murphy J in Li Chia Hsing v Rankin (1978) 141 CLR 182, 198 and Gaudron J 
in Cheng v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 248, 277. 
voice of higher authority.  The framers of the constitution strove to create an independent judiciary but 
insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action.  Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a 
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against 
the compliant or biased or eccentric judge.
17
 
Another argument in favour of the use of juries is the role they play in securing and 
maintaining public confidence in the justice system.  This was the fact that led the High 
Court to deny that an accused could waive the right to trial by jury referred to in respect of 
Commonwealth offences in s80 of the Constitution – on the basis that the reasons for the 
use of the jury system were based on higher principles than what the accused wanted in a 
particular case.18  
 
Nemeth argued in the context of the unanimous vs majority verdict issue that 
The considerations involved in unanimity versus non-unanimity in jury deliberations are not simply whether or 
not the actual verdicts are significantly altered … What may well be altered is the belief on the part of the 
jurors that they have deliberated until all persons have agreed, that they feel the verdict was appropriate; and 
that they have a sense that justice has been administered.  If the jurors themselves feel that these values have 
not been implemented, the very important symbolic function of the trial by jury may suffer, not only for the 
jurors themselves, but for the community at large.
19
 
Large scale research projects have quantified the effect on perceptions of the criminal 
justice system that can occur through participation in the system.  For example, Matthews, 
Hancock and Briggs found that of those surveyed who had performed jury service for the 
first time, 43% had a higher degree of confidence in the justice system than before.  They 
found that, of those who participated on a jury, 58% reported an improved understanding 
of the criminal justice system, which leads to greater confidence in the criminal justice 
system.20  Another Australian study involving 1700 jurors found that, on several indicia, 
those who had acted as empanelled jurors reported substantially greater confidence in the 
criminal justice system than those who had not.  Of empanelled jurors, 45% were more 
confident about the system after service.  Those who expressed confidence in the capacity 
of judges totalled 85% of those surveyed, compared with 45% in the general community.  
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 Duncan v Louisiana (1968) 391 US 145, 156; see also Professor Story in his Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States (1833: 1970 rep Vol III 653), ‘the great object of a trial by jury in criminal 
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Journal of Applied Social Psychology 38. 
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Jury System: A Study in Six Courts, Home Office (2004); Kritzner, H M and Voelker, J ‘Familiarity Breeds 
Respect: How Wisconsin Citizens View Their Courts’ (1998) 82 Judicature 59; Cutler, B L and Hughes, D M 
‘Judging Jury Service: Results of the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts Juror Survey’ (2001) 19 
Behavioural Sciences and the Law 305. 
About 60% of those who participated on a jury believed the criminal justice system was 
efficient and fair, compared with 20% of those who did not participate in a jury.  The 
confidence level in the criminal justice system was 70% for those who had served on juries, 
and 25% for those who had not.21 
Gleeson argues that disappearance of civil jury means that  
we [the judiciary] are cutting ourselves off from the community …reduced public participation, through trial by 
jury, in the administration of civil justice has increased the separation between courts and the community.
22
 
Arguments Against the Use of Juries in their Current Format 
(1) Complexity of Trials – Evidence and Directions 
We have a criminal jury system which is superior to any in the world; and its efficiency is only marred by the 
difficulty of finding twelve people every day who don’t know anything and can’t read.
23
 
 
Juries are not legally trained and yet apply the facts of a case, based on the evidence, to the 
law in order to determine guilt.  Yet, the modern day criminal trial is becoming increasingly 
more complex, a fact acknowledged by judges24 as well as the government,25 caused by a 
range of factors, including the law itself becoming more complex, evidence and evidentiary 
rules, trial procedure and the factual circumstances of cases.  The facts and evidence in 
many instances are becoming more complicated due to factors such as technological 
advances, which have produced new and increasingly complicated crimes; challenges in 
evidence including the use of DNA evidence, the corporate being and criminal 
responsibility,26 and particularly in the context of criminal trials, mental health issues. 
The laws created to take into account these factual complexities are drafted in increasingly 
technical language.   Judges themselves can struggle to make sense of legislation.  As former 
High Court Justice Ian Callinan stated 
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 Goodman-Delahunty, J, Brewer, N, Clough, J, Horan, J, Ogloff, J, Tait, D and Pratley, J Research and Public 
Policy Series No 87, Australian Institute of Criminology (2007); Findlay also advocates the use of juries on the 
basis of public confidence in the system:  ‘Juries Reborn’ (2007) 90 Reform 9, 10. 
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 Hon Murray Gleeson AC CJ HCt, ‘Juries and Public Confidence in the Courts’ (2007) 90 Reform 12, 13. 
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 Mark Twain, Text of Undelivered Speech, 4/7/1872), reprinted in Svend Peterson ed Mark Twain and the 
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 Murray Gleeson, former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, in  ‘Juries and Public Confidence in the 
Courts’ (2007) 90 Reform 12.  Gleeson commented that ‘Justice does not require that the criminal law, as 
enacted by Parliament, or as formulated by appeal courts, should become more and more complicated.’  This 
raises the fundamental question whether our criminal laws are in themselves becoming over complicated and 
are in need of reconsideration.  See also Judge Valarie French, ‘Juries – a central pillar or an obstacle to a fair 
and timely criminal justice system’ (2007) 90 Reform 40 and Justice Roslyn Atkinson ‘Juries in the 21st Century:  
Making the bulwark better’ (2009) May Proctor 23. 
25
 Note above n 46 and 47 regarding judge only trials in circumstances where if the trial, because of its 
complexity or length or both, is likely to be unreasonably burdensome to a jury. 
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 Refer to for example the difficulties associated with prosecuting a corporation for manslaughter. 
It may come as no surprise to you that Judges, even highly experiences(d) judges, sometimes find it difficult to 
penetrate the mysteries of the ever expanding statute books. For citizens without legal training and involved in 
their daily activities the magnitude of the task must be almost beyond comprehension.
27
    
These comments can feed into another debate about the extent to which we should have 
specialist judges as opposed to generalist judges,28 but are also considered relevant to the 
topic of this paper given the need for judges to explain the law to juries, and for juries to 
understand the law properly in order to apply it.29  
Modern evidence based in technology and science is developing at such a rate that cases 
that would not have resulted in a conviction two decades ago, would now be successfully 
prosecuted.30 Further, there is what former Australian Chief Justice Gleeson terms ‘junk 
science’ in evidence, which although filtered to some extent by rules regarding the 
admissibility of evidence, the examination of expert witnesses and jury directions, still poses 
problems.31 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission notes complex evidentiary 
issues is the most likely cause of hung juries. 32   A study by the Bureau of Crime Statistics 
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 Justice Ian Callinan,  “Law, society and culture at the turn of the century” (The Archbishop Sir James Duhig 
memorial lecture,  Mayne Hall, University of Queensland  9 September 1998) 
http://www.highcourt.gov.au/speeches/callinanj/callinanj_Turnof~1.htm at 23 Nov 2009.  Some notorious 
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 For example, Judge Michel noted that ‘it seems likely that society at large, not to mention the business 
community, will be less tolerant of any inconsistent or possibly unsound adjudications by general adjudicators 
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Paul Michel ‘The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead’ (1999) 48 
American University Law Review 1177, 1184-1185.  Similarly Judge Learned Hand complained ‘I cannot stop 
without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes it possible for a man without 
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inordinate expense of time is the least of the resulting evils, for only a trained (scientist) is really capable of 
passing upon such facts … How long we shall continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and 
authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows; but all fair persons not 
conventionalised by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I think, to unite to effect some such advance … the 
court summons technical judges to whom technical questions are submitted and who can intelligently pass 
upon the issues without blindly groping (about): Parke-Davis and Co v H K Mumford Co 189 F. 95, 115 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y 1911).  A survey of judges found many did not believe they had sufficient expertise to understand 
scientific evidence often presented in court: Sophia Gatowski ‘Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of 
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World’ (2001) 25 Law and Human Behaviour 433; 
Kimberley Moore ‘Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?’ (2001) 15 Harvard Journal of 
Law and Technology 1; Shirley Dobbin ‘How Well do Judges Understand Science and Scientific Method?’ (2002) 
85 Judicature 244; Lawrence Pinsky ‘The Use of Scientific Peer Review and Colloquia to Assist Judges in the 
Admissibility Gatekeeping Mandated by Daubert’ (1997) 34 Houston Law Review 527; John Wesley ‘Scientific 
Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity’ (1984) 25 William and Mary Law Review 675. 
29
 Interestingly, McHugh J noted that ‘the more directions and warnings juries are given, the more likely it is 
that they will forget or misinterpret them’: KRM v The Queen *2001+ HCA 11, *37+. 
30
 In Queensland a good illustration of the effect of advancements in forensic science is provided by the 
controversy surround the Carroll case, The Queen v Carroll (2002) 77 ALJR 157.  The case raised double 
jeopardy questions when the police sought to use evidence that had through technology become available to 
them to charge Carroll with offences relating to a murder, when he had previously been acquitted of murder. 
31
 ‘the ability of the justice system to protect itself against technical misinformation is less than it should be’: 
Murray Gleeson AC, Chief Justice High Court of Australia, ‘Current issues for the Australian judiciary’, (Speech 
delivered at the Supreme Court of Japan Tokyo, 17
th
 January 2000). 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_japan.htm at 21st December, 2009. 
32 Queensland Parliament (Mary Westcott), Majority Verdicts in Criminal Trials, Research Brief No 04 (2006) at 
3.   
and Research (NSW) (2002) found that the odds of a hung jury in a trial lasting 11 days or 
more was 3.9 times higher than in a trial lasting 1 -3 days.  This is not surprising given 
modern criminal trial complexity, jury comprehension and juror attention spans; contrast 
the attention span of students attending a one hour lecture, which is estimated to be 
approximately 25 to 30 minutes.33 
Various studies into jury comprehension of judicial directions have been conducted and 
many indicate that jury comprehension is low, affecting their ability to apply those 
directions.34 One study using undergraduate students in a jury simulation, and thus 
requiring validation in authentic juries, indicated that the comprehension rate was at best 
80%.35 It is of concern that this group did better than representative samples of those 
eligible for jury service.36  Another study by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics 
and Research found that only 47.2% of jurors surveyed said they understood completely 
judicial directions.37  In summarising some of these studies, Hycran suggests jurors need 
further education about the nature of the task, and should be tested on their ability to 
understand instructions before hearing actual cases.38   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/view/publications/research.asp?SubArea=2006&SubNav=briefs#RBR%2020
06/04 at 21st December 2009.  The authors note that much of the research into juries in Australia takes place 
at the state level, with some evidence of a lack of co-ordination, and overlap, between the research efforts of 
different states. 
33
 Donald Bligh, What’s the Use of Lectures? (1998) 56. 
34
 Bob Hycran “The myth of trial by jury” (2005/06) 51 Criminal Law Quarterly 157, Peter Tiersma ‘Reforming 
the Language of Jury Instructions’ (1993) 22 Hofstra Law Review 37; Alan Reifman et al Real Jurors’ 
Understanding of the Law in Real Cases (1992) 16 Law and Human Behaviour 539, Walter Steele and Elizabeth 
Thornburg Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate’ (1988) 67 North Carolina Law Review 77; 
Kimball Anderson and Bruce Braun ‘The Irrebuttable Presumption that Juries Understand and Follow Jury 
Instructions’ (1995) 78 Marq L Review 791; Joel Lieberman and Bruce Sales ‘What Social Science Teaches Us 
About the Jury Instruction Process’ (1997) 3 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 589.  Note also a summary of 
literature on the area appearing in the footnotes in the High Court decision of  Zoneff v the Queen  (2000) 200 
CLR 234 at [66] – [67], and in Gacy v Welborn 994 F. 2d 305, 313 (7
th
 Cir, 1993) indicating that courts ‘often 
presume that jurors understand and follow their instructions despite evidence to the contrary’.  In a specific 
study of the jury in the complex trade practices case Brooke Group Ltd v Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp 
(1993) 509 US 209, 218, researchers concluded that ‘the jurors were overwhelmed, frustrated and confused by 
testimony well beyond their comprehension … at no time did any juror grasp – even at the margins – the law, 
the economics or any other testimony relating to the allegations or defence’.  As a result of this lack of 
comprehension of the evidence, the researchers claimed jurors were influenced by attorneys’ attire, 
demeanour and personal hygiene: Arthur Austin ‘The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media and 
Deviancy’ (1995) 73 Denver University Law Review 51, 54. 
35
 Michael Hill and David Winkler ‘Juries:  How do they work? Do we want them?’ (2000) 11 Criminal Law 
Forum 397, 434. 
36
 Michael Hill and David Winkler ‘Juries:  How do they work? Do we want them?’ (2000) 11 Criminal Law 
Forum 397, 434; at 437 Hill and Winkler provided an example of the comprehension gap ‘*aggravated assault 
means+ assaulting someone who aggravated them’. 
37
 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A review of jury directions, Issues Paper WP No 66 (2009)[7.39] 
38
 Bob Hycran “The myth of trial by jury” (2005/06) 51 Criminal Law Quarterly 157, 167.  However, as Justice 
Atkinson points out, it would be a challenge to determine how best to determine comprehension, given that 
different people understand information in different ways.  It would also impose cost:  Justice Roslyn Atkinson, 
Supreme Court of Queensland, ‘Selection of Juries: The Search for the Elusive Peer Group’, speech delivered at 
the Sir Harry Gibbs Law Dinner, University of Queensland, 11 December 2007, 
http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/2007/atkinson111207.pdf, accessed 23/11/09) 
A recent survey of judges, by the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration (2006), found 
that more than half of the judges surveyed reported that jurors have either some or a great 
deal of difficulty understanding judicial instructions on the law.39  This is consistent with a 
survey by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (1985) in which 71% of judges 
agreed that some of the directions on the law were too difficult for jurors to understand.40 
Ironically the trial process itself may impede jury comprehension by prohibiting the taking of 
notes; access to transcripts of evidence, arguments, opening remarks and or summing up; 
and asking questions during trial which is either banned or discouraged.41   
Of course these problems are not confined to Australia.  Trial complexity and jury comprehension in 
fraud cases have been the subject of investigation in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s. 
Alternatives considered included judge only trials and special expert jurors, however changes were 
never initiated.
 42
  Some American courts have referred to this difficulty expressly.43  Former Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court Warren Burger cast doubt on the ability of juries to 
understand evidence;
44
 during this era Congress even considered changes to the Federal Jury 
Selection and Service Act to require that all empanelled jurors have ‘intelligence’ and ‘common 
sense’; however the changes were never enacted.
45
 
 
Recent research has suggested that, as a consequence of increased complexities in criminal 
trials, individual jurors may be finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the demands 
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 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A review of jury directions, Issues Paper WP No 66 (2009)[3.26]   
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 Ibid, [9.73]; apparently the difficulties are worst in relation to self-defence, intoxication, mental illness, 
conspiracy, diminished responsibility, and provocation. 
41
 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A review of jury directions, Issues Paper WP No 66 (2009) [9.73].  In 
Queensland, note taking is allowed, with limits, as is juror access to transcripts.  For more on transcripts, see 
Chapter 9 of the Queensland Law Reform Commission A Review of Jury Directions, Issue Paper WP No 66 
(2009).  Unfortunately, some commentators re-focus the issue of jury comprehension on the competency of 
judge or counsel, or their explanation of the evidence. 
42
 Roskill Fraud Trial Committee; Michael Hill and David Winkler ‘Juries:  How do they work? Do we want 
them?’ (2000) 11 Criminal Law Forum 397, 429.   
43
 Most famously the United States Supreme Court in Ross v Bernhardt (1970) 396 US 531, 538, commenting 
that ‘as our cases indicate, the legal nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger 
custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and 
limitations of juries’.  The judge in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp v International Business Machines Corp 458 F. 
Supp. 423 (N.D Cal 1978) concluded that ‘the jurors were conscientious and diligent, but their past experience 
had not prepared them to decide a case involving technical and financial questions of the highest order.  
Throughout the trial, the court felt that the jury was having trouble grasping the concepts that were being 
discussed by the expert witnesses, most of whom had doctorate degrees in their specialities’ (447);  Wiliam 
Luneburg and Mark Nordenberg ‘Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for 
Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation’ (1981) 67 Virginia Law Review 885, 891-893. 
44
 ‘Is Our Jury System Working?’ (1981) 118 Reader’s Digest 126; ‘The Use of Lay Jurors in Complicated Civil 
Cases’, remarks to the Conference of State Chief Justices 7/8/79. 
45
 The United States Supreme Court has recognised that sometimes jurors are not equipped to handle cases: 
Peters v Kiff (1972) 407 US 493; it found that the constitutional right to due process could be compromised by 
the hearing of the case by an incompetent jury (501).  Chief Justice Seitz of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
commented that ‘when the jury is unable to determine the normal application of the law to the facts of a case 
and reaches a verdict on the basis of nothing more than its own determination of community wisdom and 
values, its operation is indistinguishable from arbitrary and unprincipled decision making’: In Re Japanese 
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation 631 F. 2d 1069, 1084; see also Ryan Seidemann, James Wilkins and 
Mindy Heidel ‘Closing the Gate on Questionable Expert Witness Testimony: A Proposal to Institute Expert 
Review Panels’ (2006) 33 Southern University Law Review 29, 54-55. 
made upon them.  Trials have been increasingly weighed down with detail; even the most 
devoted and committed supporter of trial by jury must acknowledge that the strains on 
jurors when trying major cases and, thus, the strains on the administration of justice, are 
great.46  
Some respond to these criticisms by suggesting changes to the way evidence is dealt with at 
trial in order to enhance understanding.47  To some extent this has happened by, for 
example, introducing and or reviewing standard judicial directions in summing up; giving 
juries more information, such as transcripts, to assist with their decision making; and 
allowing note taking and questions.48  However such methods can also arguably increase 
complexity and cause delay in decision making, adding to cost.    
The pressures on judges to ‘get it right’ have also contributed to the complexity of judicial 
directions.  Former Victorian appellate court judge Eames drew attention to the problems 
arising from judicial directions:  
Over the past 20 years 24 appellate courts have applied great intellectual skill to the articulation and 
refinement of the criminal law but, with some notable exceptions, have not attempted to translate their 
judgments into the language of practical, and brief, directions which trial judges can deliver to lay jurors.  That 
role has fallen to the authors of court bench books or has been left to individual judges when fashioning a jury 
charge for an individual case.  Being fearful of error, judges have tended to couch their charges in language 
very close to that of the appellate judgments.  When in doubt as to the applicability of one or other of the 
judicial warnings to the case at hand judges have usually included such directions. In the result, directions on a 
wide range of topics have become longer and more complex.
49
  
Whilst judges may be guided by ‘Bench Book’s, every factual circumstance and trial is 
different, requiring the alignment of the facts and evidence with the law.   The process is 
reliant on a judge’s interpretation and the communication of that interpretation.   From a 
judge’s perspective the process is a difficult one, as acknowledged by judges themselves.50   
There is a fine line between how much a jury should or should not be told and a proper, or 
mis-direction which can ground a right of appeal.   The Queensland Law Reform Commission 
notes: 
the number and length of jury directions have increased in recent times to the point where it is now 
increasingly apparent that directions may no longer serve their principle function of stating clearly [and simply] 
the law and rules of evidence that the jury must apply.  The consequence of this is that juries (and judges) 
become over burdened with directions that ultimately serve to confuse rather than clarity.
51
   
A recent survey by the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration (2006) reports 
directions in cases involving a five day trial lasting up to two and a half hours, to a twenty 
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day trial lasting up to six hours, with the majority of time in most cases being spent on 
directions relating to the evidence.52  The way Bench Book directions are written and judicial 
expression in the communication of direction also impacts on jury comprehension.  Use of 
plain English is a method adopted to alleviate problems,53 however this itself raises the issue 
of the tension between the expressions of the law in plain English and the danger of 
misrepresenting the technicality of the law in that expression.  Some legal terminology 
cannot be translated or defined easily, carrying with it meaning steeped in judicial authority.  
One example is the concept of provocation, a term whose popular meaning differs 
substantially from its legally understood meaning.     
In the United States judicial directions to the jury are much shorter than in Australia, 
apparently because the elaboration and assessment of the facts is said to be a matter for 
the jury.54  Jurors themselves have expressed concerns with their ability to understand the 
evidence presented.55 
In Australia there are judicial pronouncements that the law should not be elaborated upon 
in certain areas, for example in directing the jury on the meaning of intention; even though 
the concept carries with it a meaning embedded in evidentiary technicality56.  There are 
other areas of the law where the courts have been given similar directions, raising the 
question whether such restrictions are contrary to the right to a fair trial. 
Together with the Queensland Law Reform Commission,57 Justice Atkinson identifies other 
aspects of the criminal trial leading to complexity in the context of judicial directions, 
including cases of multiple or alternative charges and cases involving multiple defendants.58  
Murray Gleeson suggests that from the beginning peer juries may be at a disadvantage: 
regrettably, the workings of the courts is not well understood in the community – people outside the legal 
profession are generally not well-informed about the work of courts as institutions, or of judges as 
individuals.
59
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Of course, if jurors do not understand the complexities of a case and or judicial instructions, 
there can be no assurance that the verdict represents a finding by the jury under the law 
and upon the evidence.60  The increasing number of cases in which accuseds are self-
represented can only add to the problem that sometimes jurors don’t understand the case 
well enough, given arguments that the adversarial system generally presumes that cases are 
presented by skilled professionals, and that the system breaks down when that assumption 
does not hold.61    
(2) Subjectivity of Verdicts  
Judge only trials, majority verdicts, trial complexity, judicial directions and jury 
comprehension all carry implications for the standard upon which judgment is passed in a 
criminal trial; beyond a reasonable doubt, a concept with intrinsic problems. 
In a judge only trial, obviously the judge is the sole arbiter of guilt, whereas in a jury trial 
judgment the decision is balanced amongst a jury of (typically) twelve.  For judge only trials, 
the concept of reasonable doubt is diluted to the reasonable doubt of one person.  Those 
experienced with the system acknowledge the ‘human element’ involved.  Michael Kirby 
states that  
decision-making in any circumstance is a complex function combining logic and emotion, rational application 
of intelligence and reason, intuitive responses to experience, as well as physiological and psychological forces  
of which the decision-maker can be only partly aware.
62
   
Margaret Cunnen states that  
studies of jury patterns and the experience of individual jurors show that jurors interpret what they see and 
hear in a trial through the prism of their own knowledge, experiences, attitudes and – biases – the natural 
biases of each individual are diluted and balanced one with the other.
63
   
That juries, and to a much lesser extent judges, base their decisions on their own 
experiences cannot be denied.  The extent to which it determines their verdict is another 
question, but the question is whether a jury decision based on subjective experience, 
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intuition or common sense is the same as a decision based on the comprehended 
application of the law to the facts and evidence, as guided by judicial directions, beyond a 
reasonable doubt?   
The changing composition of juries is also the cause of new and sometimes novel concerns 
regarding jury attention spans and comprehension.  The Hon Justices Michael Kirby and 
Michael Black point out that jury pools are constantly changing with demographic changes 
and changes to society itself, raising new issues for consideration.  Black uses the example 
of the smoking juror banned from smoking in a public building and making decisions whilst 
suffering withdrawal,64 while the Hon Justice Michael Kirby referring to research in both the 
US and Australia pointing out dilemmas presented by ethnicity and differences between 
generations and the mix of generations in the jury room: 
the changing ethic background and linguistic skills of jurors will profoundly affect not only communication with 
them and within the jury room itself.  It will also affect matters beyond language.  Relevant considerations are 
their life’s experiences, their assumptions about government, law, policing and punishment, their religious 
belief systems (if any) and their commitment to, and belief in, the constitutional legal arrangements of which 
the jury is one part … there is a growing appreciation today that generational factors, affecting receptiveness 
to long intervals of oral presentation of evidence and argument, may influence the decisions reached at the 
end of a jury trial. 
65
 
A related problem is one of jury deliberation dynamics.  In a project designed to unlock jury 
room secrets, the deliberations of two simulated juries in a hypothetical murder/assisted 
suicide case tried by a retired Judge were observed, and although neither jury convicted, the 
outcomes of each differed and the more ‘robust’ of the two juries was left undecided.66 
(3) Lack of Understanding of Concept of Beyond Reasonable Doubt 
Many question juror comprehension of the meaning of the criminal standard of proof.  
Various studies conducted have highlighted that different jurors interpret the concept 
differently, and sometimes incorrectly, and have found that jurors struggle with the 
concept.67  In a study simulating juror environments a juror asked to define ‘reasonable 
doubt’ responded, ‘reasonable doubt means that there can be reasonable doubt about a 
person’s guilt but you may still convict based on other reasons’,68 and in a real case on 
delivery of verdict a juror stated ‘we have considered the evidence and what your lawyer 
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has said.  We are satisfied that there is a reasonable doubt whether you committed this 
offence so we shall convict you and give you a conditional discharge’.69 
The High Court of Australia has directed that trial judges should not engage in any 
explanation of the concept70 on the basis that it is an expression used in ordinary parlance 
and well understood by the community.71  The Court has noted that community members 
are not required to submit their mental processes to objective analysis,72 and departures 
from the phrase have not worked.73  Members of the High Court have suggested that any 
explanation of the concept to also consider the danger involved in an attempt to explain the 
concept, in terms of misunderstanding.74  These directives from the High Court have been 
reiterated more recently by the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v Punj.75   
Research has suggested a range of views on the precise meaning of ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ (BRD) and a clear divergence between what judges believe the concept means and 
what some jurors think it means.  For example, in one study 26% of respondents (jurors and 
students) would be satisfied (in applying the BRD test) with a probability level of guilt below 
.7, 20% satisfied with a probability level between .7 and .9, and 54% satisfied with a 
probability level about .9.  Of the judges surveyed, 4% would be satisfied with a probability 
level below .7, 33% would be satisfied with a probability level between .7 and .9, while 63% 
would have required a probability figure above .9.76 
 Additional problems are encountered regarding onus and burdens of proof, which can differ 
between the offences, excuses and defences in criminal law, and particularly where proof 
requirements are stated in the positive or negative, and where only one element of a test 
that applies to that excuse or defence must be shown for the defence or excuse to fail.77  
One can question the simplicity of the existing formulation from the perspective of a jury 
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dealing with onus of proof requirements for the offence with the overlay of disproof where 
the excuse is raised.78  Different burdens of proof can apply in the one case, for example 
where the standard for the application of a defence or excuse79 is reduced to one of a 
balance of probabilities, as is the case with insanity.80 This issue has been identified by the 
survey of Australian and New Zealand by the Australian Institution of Judicial administration, 
as problematic in terms of jury comprehension.81 
(4) Effect of Publicity and Media  
The widespread reporting of crime, including through technology, has created tensions 
between the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence, and open justice.82 
Information obtained by media publicity that may otherwise be inadmissible in court may 
sway jury decision making.   Whilst the courts have some formal power to minimise the 
effects of media publicity,83 and this is one of the reasons sometimes given for the 
introduction of trial by judge alone,84 one might question whether such steps are sufficient 
and to what extent jurors are actually able to filter such material out.     
It is also relatively common that a trial is aborted or conviction overturned due to an unwise 
or inadvertent comment in court or some media airing.  When the evidence is completed 
there is a prospect that the jury may not be able to reach a verdict.85   
(5) Jurors as Fact Finders 
Some laud juries for their ability to establish the existence of facts.  However, in Australia 
the civil jury system has disappeared, and juries have never really been utilised in the 
Federal Court system: civil or criminal.  This in itself is not a reason to abandon peer jury 
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criminal trials, especially as the stakes are higher in terms of outcomes.  However, as Horan 
notes some of the basic arguments for and against the civil jury system equally apply to 
criminal juries.86  In considering civil juries, French states there is no argument for its 
retention based upon jury role in fact finding and assessing credibility of witnesses, as 
judges are able to do this in civil cases.87  But one can question whether any one person is 
better placed than another to draw full proof conclusions from witness testimony.   Former 
High Court Justice Michael Kirby states: 
In the past, there was a great deal of confidence about the capacity of a judge (or any other formal decision-
maker) to tell the truth from the appearance of a witness and the witness's demeanour when giving evidence. 
Empirical evidence casts serious doubt on the capacity of any human being to tell truth from falsehood from 
the observations of a witness, giving testimony, in the artificial and stressful circumstances of a courtroom.  
Appellate courts encourage judges to search for truth in the contemporary materials, objective and 
indisputable facts and the logic of the evidence rather than basing conclusions on responses to witnesses 
which may be erroneous and completely unfair.
88
  
Other members of the High Court apparently agreed that civil trials by judge alone are as 
good as trial by jury.89   
(6) Public Confidence  
While earlier we acknowledged research suggesting improved confidence in the criminal 
justice system associated with the use of juries, the research also showed that levels of 
confidence increased with levels of satisfaction regarding experience,90 that some jurors lost 
confidence in the system as a result of their experiences and recognise flaws within the 
system but were unable to think of a better one that would work more efficiently.91  Whilst 
confidence in the criminal justice system is imperative and contributes to perceptions of 
legitimacy, higher level confidence is arguably confined to those who have served on juries, 
and are as such educated in its workings, and exact levels of confidence are linked to 
individual experiences.  The question is whether confidence is a function of education 
about, and experiences within, the system. 
If the answer is yes, confidence and legitimacy can be engendered in alternative models of 
the administration of justice.  Justice Cullinane has noted that in several European countries 
there is a prohibition against the type of trial by jury which exists in common law countries. 
This is because all judgements of all courts are to be accompanied by reasons –ironically, 
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given the rationale for juries in common law systems, something which is seen as a 
protection against arbitrary power.   The adversarial system has been rejected by civil law 
countries as alien to principles underlying the inquisitorial process.92  Judge French 
considered that given the option of a peer jury criminal trial as an accused, she would take 
her chances if guilty, especially given that ‘if jury decisions are in error they tend to err in 
favour of acquittal’; she would not leave her fate in the hands of a jury who do not provide 
reasons for their decision, or are otherwise accountable for the outcome.93  
(7) Appeals 
The evidence suggests that successful appeal rates against convictions are relatively high.  
For example, it is estimated that 30% of appeals to the Queensland Court of Appeal concern 
jury directions.94  Of the 538 appeals against conviction filed in the Victorian Court of 
Criminal Appeal, about 2/3 were based on misdirection.95  Approximately 28% of these 
appeals against conviction were successful, usually leading to a retrial.96   
This highlights the power of appellate judges to substitute their verdict for that of a jury, 
given the fact that although the appellate court has access to transcripts of the trial, the judges 
have not been privy to jury deliberations of those facts and ultimately the basis of the jury 
verdict.  This raises fundamental questions of fairness and whether the appellate court is 
effectively usurping the role of a jury. 97  In appeals based on misdirections, in other words no 
reasonable jury would have convicted if properly directed,98 judges are interpreting what 
the decision of a reasonable jury (w)(s)hould have been, and in doing so usurping a jury 
function.  In addition, determining questions on appeal on the basis of what a reasonable 
jury (w)(s)hould have done, exists in sharp contrast to the concept of trial by peers, ordinary 
people determining guilt.99 This contrast can be justified in requiring the determination of 
appeals based on the higher standard of a reasonable jury, but ironically also raises 
questions regarding competency of ordinary juries.  
There is a large expense associated with such re-trials;  the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission estimated the cost of a five day appeal in County Court at $55250, including 
lawyer’s fees and cost to the court.100  The Queensland Law Reform Commission has 
expressly questioned whether the financial costs and other burdens associated with re-trials 
are an acceptable cost of ensuring as far as possible that no one is convicted without a fair 
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trial.101 When introducing majority verdicts, the New South Wales Government claimed the 
reforms ‘will help to ensure that court resources are not wasted on unnecessary retrials—
retrials that have been ordered simply because of circumstances that affect only one or two 
jurors and pose no threat to an accused's right to a fair trial.’102 
(8) Juries Are Not Representative 
Referring to an article by Richard M Re, Justice Atkinson states that  
research carried out in the United States suggests that public confidence in juries is greater when jury 
members are more representative of the community. -- At present we do not appear to achieve either of these 
aims very well and yet trial by jury is fundamental to the community’s involvement and confidence in the 
criminal justice system. 
103
  
Justice Atkinson goes on to identify a New South Wales District Court case where the failure 
to have a representative jury led to a jury being discharged for lack of representativeness as 
the accused was an indigenous person and all the members of the jury were non-
indigenous, indigenous people having been stood down by the prosecution. 104  
A common theme of jury research is that juries are no longer, if they every truly were,105 a 
randomly selected cross sectional representation of our population,106 despite the High 
Court’s orthodox view that ‘the relevant essential feature or requirement of the institution 
was, and is, that the jury be a body of person’s representative of the wider community’.107 
Such representation is seen as the cornerstone on which jury by peers operates and integral 
                                                          
101
 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Jury Directions: Issues Paper WP No 66 (2009) 5.63.   
102
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates: Jury System Reform, at 6948, the Hon John Hatzistergos  
Attorney General http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/hansart.nsf/V3Key/LC20080506033 at 
24 November, 2009. 
103
  Justice Roslyn Atkinson Supreme Court of Queensland “Selection of Juries: the search for the elusive peer 
group” (Speech delivered at the Jury Research and Practice Conference, Sydney, 11 December 2007) 1 and 2, 
at  http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/2007/atkinson111207.pdf at 23 November, 2009.  Referring to 
Richard M Re “Re-justifying the Fair Cross-Section Requirement: Equal Representation and Enfranchisement in 
the American Criminal Jury”, (2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 1568, 1574.  
104
  Justice Roslyn Atkinson Supreme Court of Queensland “Selection of Juries: the search for the elusive peer 
group” (Speech delivered at the Jury Research and Practice Conference, Sydney, 11 December 2007) 2, at  
http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/2007/atkinson111207.pdf at 23 November, 2009; Neil Rees, `R v Smith` 
(1982) 813 Aboriginal Law Bulletin 11.   
105
 There is a plethora of literature regarding of the marginalisation of certain, and mostly minority, groups of 
the population regarding jury service.  At the same time much of this literature also comes full circle regarding 
the overrepresentation of certain population groups in jury service due to the ease with which certain 
members of the population seem to be excused from jury service and the resultant effect on the demographic 
skewing of juries.  For example, most professionals are excused from jury service leaving the unemployed and 
retired to fulfil the role. 
106
 Cf Jacqueline Horan, ‘The law and lore of the Australian civil jury and civil justice system’ (2006) 9 Flinders 
Journal of Law Reform 29, 47 whose argues based on a survey conducted in 2001 that juries are not as 
unrepresented as some argue, and are broadly representative of the Victorian community.  The author also 
states based on the results of the survey that the average civil juror is better educated than the average 
Victorian (which raises the question of how is this so, given that the jury is supposed to be representative of 
the community). 
107
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to the protection of the democratic rights of a citizen to participate in governance and the 
rights of an accused to an impartial and fair trial. 
An initial observation regarding random selection is whether the process itself ensures a 
jury by peers.108  Added to this are the difficulties associated with ensuring cross sectional 
representation in view of exemption policies in many jurisdictions.   Whilst rules vary 
between jurisdictions they are subject to considerable debate and criticism.  In a survey 
conducted in Western Australia in 1983, 88.9% of respondents felt that highly educated 
persons such as professors, school teachers, doctors, [and] clergymen, should not continue 
to be exempt from jury service,109 and in line with such views some jurisdictions have 
responded by reconsidering jury disqualifications and excuses.110  This should improve the 
representative nature of juries.111   
The problem of unrepresentative juries is made worse by the generally low rates of pay 
offered to jurors, meaning well-paid potential jury members have a greater financial 
incentive to seek to avoid service.112   
Some states in the US have opted for no exemption juries; as a result practising attorneys, 
former judges, police officers and others with legal expertise serve on juries.113   Whilst in 
some states these specific classes of persons are disqualified from jury service, other 
educated and professionals on any jury may have had some legal education and bring that 
with them to the jury room.  Is this necessarily a bad thing? 
Grounds for excuse from jury service vary across jurisdictions.114  For example, under the 
Jury Act 1995 (Qld) the criteria to be applied on an application to be excused from jury 
service are substantial hardship due to employment or personal circumstances; substantial 
financial hardship;  substantial inconvenience to the public or section of the public; care 
                                                          
108
 Colin Davies and Christopher Edwards “’A jury of peers’: A comparative analysis” (2004) 68 Journal of 
Criminal Law 150 questions this concept.  For the process in Queensland refer to s 16 Jury Act 1995 (Qld) 
109
 I M Vodanovich, “Public attitudes about the jury” in D Challinger (ed), The Jury (Australian Institute of 
Criminology Seminar: Proceedings No 11, 1986) at 81. 
110
 Major reforms occurred in Queensland with the passage of the Jury Act 1995 (Qld), which removed many 
disqualifications from jury service; however disqualifications remain applicable to judges, magistrates, police, 
detention centre employees, correctional services officers, those over 70, those who are not literate in English, 
those with physical or mental disability, and those convicted of an indictable offence.    
111
 Justice Atkinson poses some important questions regarding disqualifications, including who determines 
them, and which disabilities are considered to stop jurors from carrying out juror functions.  She questions 
whether those involved in law enforcement or otherwise in the criminal justice system should be excluded, or 
whether prisoners should be excluded:  ‘Selection of Juries: The Search for the Elusive Peer Group’, speech 
presented at the Jury Research and Practice Conference, Sydney, 11/12/2007, p9. 
(http://archive.sclqld.org.au/judgepub/2007/atkinson111207.pdf, accessed 23/11/09. 
112
 Graham Lilly ‘The Decline of the American Jury’ (2001) 72 University of Colorado Law Review 53, 63-64. 
113 Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG ‘Lawyers as communicators’  (Speech delivered at the Worldwide 
Advocacy Conference: Speaking to the modern jury – New challenges for judges and advocates, London, 29 
June to 2nd July 1998) 4, at http://www.highcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_london.htm    
114 A 1986 Western Australian survey found that 89% of those surveyed thought highly educated people 
should not be excluded from jury service: I M Vodanovich ‘Public Attitudes About the Jury’ in D Challenger ed 
The Jury (1986) p81. 
givers; health; or anything else stated in a practical direction.115  Again, these raise questions 
of interpretation and proof.116  
An option to alleviate this problem is to make jury service compulsory; however this raises 
questions of how to practically force an unwilling person to serve.  Some who had already 
served as jurors appear unwilling to do so again.117   Compulsory jury service also raises 
questions about the decision making by a hostile juror in the context of fair trial, or that a 
person forced to act as a juror may adopt a passive-aggressive stance, refusing to 
participate in the process.  These options sit oddly with theory, and support in some ways 
the argument for professional juries in this article. 
The representative nature of the jury is further diluted by procedures on selection prior to trial.  In 
Queensland the prosecution and defence are entitled to eight peremptory challenges, with 
additional limited peremptory challenges from the pool of reserve jurors;118 and challenges 
for cause, on the basis of qualification for jury service, questions of impartiality or special 
reason.119 The defendant may also challenge the jury panel as a whole120 and a Judge retains 
the discretion to discharge an entire jury on the grounds that its composition may cause the 
trial to be, or appear to be, unfair.121  The ability to challenge is supported by the right of the 
defendant to be informed of persons called upon to sit on the jury and their right to challenge 
the inclusion of individual jury members. 122   
Davies and Edwards consider that peremptory challenge can be seen as a means by which 
the randomness of the jury can be compromised. 123  Judge Valarie French agrees:  
It has been said that the combined wisdom of a jury of one’s peers is the best method of reaching a fair 
decision.  But if you have taken part in or watched a jury empanelment process that sometimes seems 
questionable – prospective jurors with management experience, small business operators, accountants and 
teachers are routinely excluded – this can leave a pool of people who appear to be unemployed, the 
disinterested or – more dangerously – the very resentful at being press ganged into service.
124
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There is evidence, at least in the United States, that some trial attorneys deliberately chose 
jurors who are not well informed.125  This practice has been noted by former United States 
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: 
It is unfortunate that, in high profile cases in this country, which sometimes are high-profile precisely because 
they are very important, courts are forced to look high and low for jurors who have never read newspapers, 
never watch the news, and never give much thought to issues of public importance.  I’m not saying that those 
jurors are incapable of deciding cases properly.  But I am saying that those jurors probably are 
unrepresentative of their community, because they probably are on average considerably less well-informed 
citizens than a random cross-section would provide.
126
 
Many academics have argued that juries are not representative of the community, because 
the selection process tends to weed out the better educated members of society.127  The 
low rate of pay creates a further disincentive for those on higher incomes, obviously 
correlated with education levels.128 
9. Juries As Currently Structured Are Not Efficient   
The efficacy, including cost efficiency, of peer jury criminal trial is often the subject of 
criticism from a number of angles.  One study found that a jury trial typically lasted twice as 
long as a non-jury trial.129  Michael Hill and David Winkler consider that the system is not 
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results efficient, from a crime control perspective130:  ‘it is true that jury trials are not 
efficient – if the measure of efficiency is cost against result or turnover’ but they then 
questions whether efficiency is the appropriate measure”.131  The answer is yes, if only from 
a sustainability perspective, and considering the alternative models argument advanced by 
this article.   
Direct costs in administration, delays and appeals bring into question peer criminal jury 
efficacy as do indirect costs, for example the economic costs due to lost production and 
social costs due to child (dependant) minding and even post jury trauma.  Savings in costs 
can potentially be achieved by considering alternatives and Judge French recognises the 
effect of judge only trials in this context.132   
The research into alternative systems can inform us regarding alternatives and reform.  
Whilst many regard our system as better than any alternative133  the Hon Justice K A 
Cullinane points out that 
The adversarial system has been rejected by the civil law countries as being alien to some of the principles 
underlying the inquisitorial process.  These include: a) the duty of the state by the presiding judge and 
investigating judge to ascertain the truth; b) the necessity of the reviewability of judgments reflected in the 
requirements for reasons of finding guilt or innocence; and c) the legality principle or the principle of 
mandatory prosecution. This would reject unbridled discretion and practices such as plea bargaining.
 134 
As this article has outlined, the existing peer jury system has a myriad of problems ranging 
from selection to facilitating appeals.   Some of the problems raised in this article have 
existed for decades, and others are emerging as society changes.  All are to varying degrees 
recognised, as is the need to address them.  On the other hand, this article has 
acknowledged the strong traditions of, and arguments for continuing use of, juries in 
appropriate cases, in terms of protection against government overreach, democracy, and 
public confidence in the justice system. 
One way to reconcile these views is to continue with the use of juries, but change their 
composition and training.  In this way, some of the strengths of the existing system can be 
retained, but some of the key weaknesses of the current jury system can be addressed.  In 
the next part of this paper, we develop some specific suggestions in this regard.  
Improvements to the Jury System 
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(i) Improving Juror Understanding 
How can we have the benefits of a jury trial elaborated above, while addressing the 
deficiencies of the jury system as currently used?  The authors would firstly suggest, having 
considered the evidence used to write this paper, that jurisdictions must be confident in the 
extent to which they educate jurors about their role and responsibilities as jurors.  This 
would include making sure that jurors understand the meaning of beyond reasonable doubt, 
and only take into account relevant evidence, and ignore peripheral ‘noise’, including media 
and publicity.  There is a similar need to review directions to jurors, so that they are as clear 
as they can be.  One overwhelming finding from the research accessed for the purposes of 
this paper has been the extent to which jurors don’t understand evidence or directions in 
many cases.  This must be an issue addressed by judges in specific trials, with greater 
guidance provided in these matters where appropriate, in what is admittedly a very difficult 
and onerous task for judges during trials.135  Perhaps there is a need to pay jurors 
appropriately, and maybe to have a volunteer system in order that only those who are 
dedicated to the task actually serve.  We do not dwell in detail here on those suggestions, 
because they have already largely been made by various law reform agencies in Australia in 
relation to the operation of juries.136 
(ii) Special Juries 
There are more contentious proposals to improve the quality of juries, involving the identity 
of those we ask to serve as jurors, and whether we expect some kind of minimum 
knowledge or skill base in order to carry out this function.  This could lead us in several 
directions, to professional juries whose full-time occupation is to act as jurors, to minimum 
educational qualifications or experience in order to serve on a jury (or on juries in some 
‘complex’ cases, however that word is defined),137 or to specialist technical experts matched 
to appropriate trials.138  These are not new suggestions worldwide, and have particular 
resonance in the United States, given the pivotal position of juries in that country’s history 
and legal system; a range of academics have called for the introduction of jurors with 
particular expertise,139 and some judges have expressed support.140  It is not an idea often 
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canvassed in Australia, however, and is considered worthy of some exploration.  We will 
focus here on the suggestion that, at least in some cases, jurors might be required to meet 
certain minimum education standards.  This is the sense in which the word ‘special’ as 
applied to jurors is used below. 
The suggestion that jurors might need some ‘special knowledge’ in order to sit on trials, or 
some trials, is controversial because it runs counter to the (current) orthodox view of what a 
jury is and how it is comprised.  However, it should not be thought to be an unprecedented 
idea.  It is worth recalling that a requirement that jurors have special knowledge is of 
ancient origin.   
As has been recorded by others, originally juries were comprised, in relation to particular 
trials, of ‘locals’ who were likely to have first hand knowledge of the events, and to bring 
such specialised knowledge of the events to the trial at hand.141  From this original position, 
there developed a concept of jurors as being impartial members of the public without 
specialist knowledge, while those with specialist knowledge came to be known as witnesses.  
Further, there developed a practice of those with particular expertise in a field adjudicating 
cases pertaining to that field.  Oldham cites many examples, including disputes of church 
patronage being heard by juries comprised of clergymen, a woman’s pregnancy claim being 
heard by a jury of matrons,142 a 1394 case where a jury of ‘cooks and fishmongers’ heard a 
trial of a defendant accused of selling bad food, booksellers and printers hearing a 1663 libel 
trial, and early King’s Bench cases reporting juries of clerks and attorneys hearing cases of 
falsification of writs by attorneys and extortion by court officials.143  Between 1190 and 
1807, English law allowed a defendant foreigner to empanel a jury from their nationality or 
race.144  Better known is the role played by commercial people on juries while Lord 
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Mansfield developed commercial law principles.145  Several American states have used 
special juries at some stage.146 
The argument is that having ‘special’ jurors would address the very strong message from the 
research referred to earlier in the paper, that jurors commonly struggle to understand, and 
do not understand, evidence in a large number of cases.  They may not understand jury 
directions or beyond reasonable doubt.  This can lead some of them to take into account 
irrelevant considerations.  These problems are considered to be extremely serious in a 
context of a process that may lead to an individual’s liberty being taken away, and a 
permanent criminal record given. 
It is argued, and studies have supported,147 that ‘special’ jurors are more likely to 
understand complex evidence or complex directions given at trial.148  As Lilly points out: 
In some types of modern trial, such as those involving complex scientific findings or esoteric economic or 
mathematical evidence, there is no adequate substitute for actually comprehending the evidence, the 
arguments of the parties, and the judge’s instructions.  In these kinds of cases, intuition and a sense of fairness 
are unlikely to produce a result that is consistent with the governing law.  Furthermore, if jurors’ intuitive 
notions of right and wrong are permitted generally to supplant understanding, reasoning and logic as the 
cornerstone of the adjudicatory process, then the highly refined and orderly presentation of evidence and the 
crafting of instructions become meaningless exercises.  Jury trial may thus devolve into a battle of instincts, 
hunches and judgments based on non-relevant criteria such as the dress and demeanour of attorneys, 
witnesses, and especially expert witnesses.
149
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It is argued that ‘special’ jurors are less likely to be influenced by pre-trial publicity or media 
reporting of pre-trial events, or the trial itself.  Such a juror might be better able to avoid 
being distracted by irrelevant facts,150 court-room theatrics or how a case is presented,151 
and focus more on the substance of the evidence.  Some studies have suggested troubling 
ways in which jurors decide complex cases.152 
On the other hand, a higher degree of juror education or expertise does not guarantee that 
the jury will find it any easier to drawn conclusions.  It is conceded that expert witnesses 
often disagree on the conclusions that can or should be drawn from the evidence.    
It is true that the notion of special juries challenges some orthodoxy about juries.  As 
Marder puts it 
The traditional view of the juror’s role throughout trial is that of an empty vessel into which information 
presented in the form of exhibits, testimony, argument and judicial instructions will be poured.
153 
It may be argued that a special jury model is inconsistent with this model, in implying that 
jurors will have a certain level of information and knowledge prior to the trial, and will bring 
it to bear in jury deliberations.  Some of the information on which their decision might be 
based may not have been subject to the usual rules of evidence, and the rigours of cross-
examination.  This leads some authors to argue that jurors should specifically be directed 
not to apply their past experience and expertise in jury deliberations.154   
On the other hand, it is fanciful to think that jurors will not bring knowledge and information 
with them to the process of jury deliberation.  They will have their own learning styles, and 
their own ways of interpreting and understanding information.  They will have had many life 
experiences.  It is unreal to expect jurors to ‘unlearn’ all of this prior to sitting on a trial.155 
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Another argument against the use of special juries is that such a system is elitist and 
inconsistent with the common understanding of the nature of juries, that they represent a 
cross-section of society and have democratic roots.156  The counter argument is that the 
objective of using better educated juries is actually to improve the integrity of the process, 
and to make it as good as it can be.  When an individual’s liberty is at stake, the authors 
believe that it is worth considering measures to increase the likelihood that jurors 
understand the evidence they are hearing, understand the directions the judge is giving 
them, can properly weight evidence, understand the principles that they are being asked to 
apply, and are better able to filter out irrelevancies.  It is not considered elitist to want to 
minimise the risk of incorrect verdicts, and if the authors were asked whether they 
preferred ‘representative juries’ or juries that made the ‘correct’ decision on the evidence 
given, they would have no hesitation in indicating the latter. 
Conclusion 
Whilst many of the authors of literature relied upon in the compilation of this article, among 
them many judges, are advocates of a peer jury criminal justice system and cite cogent 
reasons for its retention, there are concerns with the sustainability of the current model.  
An alternative that would address many of the concerns raised by critics of the jury system 
discussed in this article would be to have better informed juries.  This could occur through 
better processes as described in Chapter 8 and 9 of the recent Issues Paper.  However, at 
least in some cases, there should be the ability for a judge to request a jury comprised of 
jurors with certain minimum educational standards.  It is expected that this option would be 
used in ‘complex cases’157 in terms of the evidence to be presented, or the law to be applied 
in the particular area.   
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